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ABSTRACT
Today, the publication of microdata poses a privacy threat. Vast
research has striven to define the privacy condition that microdata
should satisfy before it is released, and devise algorithms to anony-
mize the data so as to achieve this condition. Yet, no method pro-
posed to date explicitly bounds the percentage of information an
adversary gains after seeing the published data for each sensitive
value therein. This paper introduces β-likeness, an appropriately
robust privacy model for microdata anonymization, along with two
anonymization schemes designed therefor, the one based on gen-
eralization, and the other based on perturbation. Our model pos-
tulates that an adversary’s confidence on the likelihood of a certain
sensitive-attribute (SA) value should not increase, in relative differ-
ence terms, by more than a predefined threshold. Our techniques
aim to satisfy a given β threshold with little information loss. We
experimentally demonstrate that (i) our model provides an effective
privacy guarantee in a way that predecessor models cannot, (ii) our
generalization scheme is more effective and efficient in its task than
methods adapting algorithms for the k-anonymity model, and (iii)
our perturbation method outperforms a baseline approach. More-
over, we discuss in detail the resistance of our model and methods
to attacks proposed in previous research.
1. INTRODUCTION
Organizations, such as government agencies or hospitals, reg-
ularly release microdata (e.g., census data or medical records) to
serve benign purposes. However, such data can inadvertently re-
veal sensitive personal information to malicious adversaries. Ex-
perience has shown that merely concealing explicit identifying at-
tributes, such as name or phone number, does not suffice to protect
personal privacy. An attacker may still uncover hidden identities
and/or sensitive information, by joining the released microdata at-
tributes with other publicly available data. The set of attributes
instrumental to that purpose, such as gender, zipcode, and age, are
called quasi-identifiers (QIs). The anonymization problem calls for
∗Work supported by a Rutgers Business School RRC grant.
bringing the data to a form that forestalls such linking attacks while
preserving as much of the original information as possible.
The question of the form the data should be brought to is a sub-
ject of inquiry in itself. Past research has tried to formulate a pri-
vacy guarantee an anonymized data set should satisfy, using syn-
tactic and perturbation-based methods.
Syntactic anonymization methods typically postulate that micro-
data be partitioned into a set of equivalence classes (ECs), such that
all tuples within an EC be indistinguishable from (or mutually inter-
changeable with [33]) each other as far as their QIs are concerned.
The models differ in the condition that an eligible EC should sat-
isfy. By k-anonymity, each EC should consist of at least k tuples
[29]. In effect, k-anonymity protects against identity disclosure, as
it hides each released tuple in a crowd of at least k−1 others, but
does not attend to the values of a non-QI sensitive attribute (SA);
hence, the privacy regarding such values may be compromised. To
address this limitation, ℓ-diversity requires that each EC contain
at least ℓ different “well represented” SA values (in a mathematical
sense) [22]. Even so, ℓ-diversity fails to protect against attacks aris-
ing from an adversary’s unavoidable knowledge of each SA value’s
frequency in a released table. As a rectification to this problem,
t-closeness proposes a condition that bounds the cumulative differ-
ence between the frequency distribution of SA values in an EC and
their overall distribution [20]. Yet, as we will discuss, such a bound
fails to provide a meaningful privacy guarantee that lays grounds
for effective and human-understandable policy [25].
Perturbation-based methods add noise to the data so as to achieve
a privacy property. The models in [10, 30, 5] impose a bound on an
adversary’s posterior confidence about a data property in relation to
the prior one; however, they measure confidence gain in absolute,
not in relative terms. Other noise-adding methods enforce differ-
ential privacy [9], which guarantees that the effect of any particular
individual’s data on a query result is dominated by the noise; in
other words, the result is broadly the same, regardless of whether a
certain individual has contributed her true information. Yet, as [6]
shows, an individual’s SA value can be inferred from differentially
private data with non-trivial accuracy, while the added noise can
dominate small values in the results of aggregate queries [32].
In this paper, we propose β-likeness: a robust and intuitive model
for microdata anonymization, postulating that an adversary’s con-
fidence in a tuple’s SA value should not increase in relative terms
by more than a threshold after seeing the published data. We ac-
company this model with two anonymization schemes tailored for
its particular requirements: one based on generalization, and one on
perturbation; the latter can better handle remote outliers. We exper-
imentally demonstrate that our schemes: (i) provide effective pri-
vacy guarantees in a way that state-of-the-art t-closeness schemes
cannot; and (ii) are more efficient than competing approaches.
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2. RELATED WORK AND ARGUMENT
The first model suggested for anonymizing microdata while pre-
serving their integrity was k-anonymity [29]; it suggests grouping
tuples in ECs of at least k tuples each, with indistinguishable QI
values. As the problem of optimal (i.e., minimum-information-
loss) k-anonymization is NP-hard [23] in non-trivial cases, past
research has proposed several heuristics. Such schemes transform
the data by generalization and/or suppression. Generalization re-
places, or recodes, all values of a QI attribute in an EC by a range
containing them. For example, QI gender with values male and
female can be generalized to person, and QI age with values 20, 25
and 32 can be generalized to [20, 32]. Suppression is an extreme
case of generalization that deletes some QI values or even tuples.
Still, the k-anonymity model suffers from a critical limitation.
While its objective is to conceal sensitive information, it pays no at-
tention to non-QI sensitive attributes (SAs). A k-anonymized table
may contain ECs with so skewed a distribution of SA values, that
an adversary can still infer the SA value of a record with high confi-
dence. To address this limitation, [22] proposed ℓ-diversity, which
postulates that each EC contain at least ℓ “well represented” SA
values, where “well represented” can be defined in diverse ways.
Still, ℓ-diversity fails to guarantee privacy when the distribution
of SA values differs substantially among ECs and from their over-
all distribution; thus, it is vulnerable to a skewness attack [20]. For
instance, assume a 10-diverse form T ′ of a medical record table T ,
in which 0.1% persons are infected with HIV, and an EC G ∈ T ′
containing 10 distinct SA values, with one occurrence of HIV. The
probability of HIV is 10% for a tuple in G, but only 0.1% for a tuple
in T . This 100-fold increase of probability is a significant, hence
undesirable, information leak. Furthermore, a similarity attack [20]
is likely when the SA values in an EC are semantically similar. For
example, a 3-diverse table can be generated from Table 1 by putting
the first 3 tuples in EC G1, and the rest EC G2. Regardless of their
diversity, all tuples in G1 indicate a nervous problem.
ID Name Weight Age Disease
01 Mike 70 40 headache
02 John 60 60 epilepsy
03 Bob 50 50 brain tumors
04 Alice 70 50 heart murmur
05 Beth 80 50 anemia
06 Carol 60 70 angina
Table 1: Patient records
To forestall these attacks, Li et al. proposed t-closeness, which
requires that a cumulative difference of the SA values’ distribution
within any EC from the one in the overall table does not exceed a
given threshold t [20]. The t threshold is meant to constrain the in-
formation an adversary gains after seeing a single EC, with respect
to that provided by the full released table. Just like ℓ-diversity is
open to many ways of measuring the number of “well-represented”
values in an EC [22], the t-closeness model is open to diverse ways
of measuring the cumulative difference between the overall SA dis-
tribution, P , and that in an EC,Q. One option is the Earth Mover’s
Distance (EMD) [28]. Another proposal [20] first transforms P
(Q) to P̂ (Q̂) by kernel smoothing, and then calculates the Jensen-
Shannon divergence between P̂ and Q̂ as the approximate distance
between P and Q. Last, the Kullback-Leibler divergence is used
in [27]. Yet these functions all interpret the t threshold as a bound
on the cumulative difference between two frequency distributions.
Indeed, this interpretation emanates out of the t-closeness model
itself [20]. Still, a privacy model should provide grounds for effec-
tive and human-understandable policy [25]. Models that bound a
cumulative function of frequency differences between distributions
fails to provide a comprehensible relationship between the t thresh-
old and the privacy it affords. In particular, such models do not pay
due attention to less frequent SA values, which are more vulner-
able to privacy exposure; and do not distinguish between positive
and negative variation in an SA value’s frequency.
We first elaborate on EMD. Assume a data set DB with SA val-
ues HIV and Flu. If the overall SA distribution between them is
P = (0.4, 0.6), and their distribution in an EC is Q= (0.5, 0.5),
then EMD(P ,Q)= 0.1. Still, if their overall distribution is P ′=
(0.01, 0.99) and their distribution in an EC is Q′ = (0.11, 0.89),
then EMD(P ′,Q′)= 0.1 again. Both cases satisfy 0.1-closeness.
However, the information gain in the latter case is much larger than
that in the former: the probability of HIV rises by 25% from 0.4 to
0.5, but by 1000% from 0.01 to 0.11. In effect, the two cases do
not afford the same privacy. This example appears in [20], where
it is noted that EMD does not provide a clear privacy guarantee. In
fact, not only EMD, but any function that aggregates absolute dif-
ferences faces a similar problem, since such functions do not pro-
vide maximum relative difference guarantees [14, 13] about individ-
ual SA values. In our example, a small relative difference of Flu-
frequency evens up a large relative difference of HIV-frequency.
K-L divergence [27] and J-S divergence [20, 21] also fail to pay
equal attention to all SA values and their relative differences. In
our running example, assume a dataset where the overall distribu-
tion of HIV and Flu is P˜=(0.01, 0.99), and their distribution in an
EC is Q˜=(0.03, 0.97). Then the K-L (J-S) divergence between P
and Q, is 0.0290 (0.0073), while that between P˜ and Q˜ is 0.0133
(0.0038). Both these alternatives estimate the privacy afforded by
Q˜ with respect to P˜ as higher than that afforded by Q with respect
to P . However, the confidence for HIV increases only by 25% in
the latter case, while it rises by 200% in the former.
Besides, the anonymization schemes in [20] are mere extensions
of k-anonymization techniques [17, 18]. They do not cater to the
special needs of t-closeness, hence yield low information quality.
Recently, [4] proposed an anonymization algorithm specialized for
t-closeness, yet did not discuss the limitations of the model itself.
Last, the anonymization scheme in [27] uses perturbation and adds
noise to the data, damaging their truthfulness.
The privacy model of [10] imposes a bound ρ2 to the poste-
rior probability (i.e., after release) of certain properties in the data,
given a bound ρ1 on the prior probability (i.e., before release). This
model is modified in [30], where the posterior confidence should
not exceed the prior one by more than ∆. These models measure
the absolute confidence gain (i.e., information leak), hence do not
sufficiently protect the privacy of infrequent values. For example
they treat a probability increase from 60% to 80% as tantamount to
an increase from 1% to 21% in absolute terms, while the latter is
an increase by 2000% and the former by 33% in relative terms.
Alternative approaches enforce differential privacy [9]. By this
model, the data owner adds noise to a query result so as to guaran-
tee that this noisy result would change very little with the variation
of a particular individual’s data. However, [16] illustrates that dif-
ferential privacy does not adequately limit inference about an indi-
vidual’s participation in the data generating process. Furthermore,
and more importantly for the focus of our work, [6] has recently
shown that, even though the effect of any single individual is dom-
inated by the added noise, the noise itself is in turn dominated by
the signal emerging from the whole population. Consequently, one
can effectively build a Naı¨ve Bayes classifier inferring individuals’
SA values with non-trivial accuracy [6].
A recently proposed distribution-oriented privacy model is δ-dis-
closure-privacy [3]; it requires that for any SA value vi with fre-
quency pi in the original table, its frequency in any EC, qi, should
be such that
∣∣∣log ( qipi )∣∣∣ < δ. Yet this model fails in two respects:
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(1) since log(qi) is defined only for qi > 0, δ-disclosure-privacy
strictly requires that each SA value in the original table occurs in
every EC; (2) given a sufficiently large value of pi and a modest
value of δ, δ-disclosure-privacy does not effectively upper-bound
qi, hence allows for absolute certainty of one’s SA value, which is
exactly the kind of leak it is meant to prevent. These properties
render δ-disclosure-privacy unnecessarily rigid, in one way, and
yet exceedingly lax, in another way. Besides, [3] does not pro-
pose an anonymization algorithm tailored for δ-disclosure-privacy;
it only points out that the Mondrian k-anonymization algorithm
[18], adapted for δ-disclosure-privacy (as well as for ℓ-diversity
and t-closeness), yields high information loss. This negative result
is not surprising; after all, Mondrian simply partitions the data to
disjoint ECs, hence is ill-suited for models looking into the sen-
sitive values in an EC, as observed in [12] In its conclusions, [3]
observes that better anonymization algorithms are needed for those
models, but does not provide such algorithms; it focuses on a nega-
tive result without attempting to ameliorate it. In this paper, we pro-
vide a meaningful distribution-oriented privacy model that avoids
the drawbacks of δ-disclosure-privacy and t-closeness, as a well as
an anonymization algorithm specifically designed therefor. Thus,
our work goes beyond [3] in all these respects.
3. THE PRIVACYMODEL
This section introduces our privacy model. Our model assumes
that the SA distribution in DB is public knowledge, and constrains
the SA-related information gained by the table’s publication. Table
2 gathers together the notations we use.
DB Original microdata table
SA Sensitive attribute in DB
V = {v1, v2, . . . , vm} The domain of SA
Ni Number of tuples with vi in DB
pi = Ni/|DB| Frequency of vi in DB
P = (p1, p2, . . . , pm) Overall SA distribution in DB
G Equivalence class
Q = (q1, q2, . . . , qm) SA distribution in G
Table 2: Notations
DEFINITION 1 (INFORMATION GAIN). Assume that DB is a
table with a sensitive attribute SA. Let V = {v1, v2, . . . , vm}
be the SA domain, and P = (p1, p2, . . . , pm) be the overall SA
distribution in DB. Suppose that Q = (q1, q2, . . . , qm) is the SA
distribution in an equivalence class G, formed by tuples from DB.
The information gain on any SA value vi∈V is D(pi, qi), where D
is a distance function between pi and qi.
We say that the information gain on vi is positive, when pi < qi,
and negative, when pi ≥ qi. Negative information gain lowers the
correlation between a personal record and vi in EC G below that in
the whole table. In most cases, such gain enhances privacy. How-
ever, there may exist SA values such as heterosexual, for which
a reduced likelihood may inadvertently violate privacy. Neverthe-
less, we assume that the SA domain always includes the negation
of such values. Thus, negative information gain on heterosexual
always appears as positive gain for homosexual. Therefore, we can
directly control the positive gain on the value (such as homosexual)
that poses the privacy threat. For a more general case such as mar-
ital status, the negative gain on SA value married can imply that
an individual is more likely to be divorced or widowed. However,
we assume that the SA domain contains all the values of interest.
Hence, the relative negative gain of married can be transformed to
the positive gains of divorced, and widowed. Based on the above
reasonable assumption, we are concerned with positive information
gain; negative gain can be treated symmetrically if circumstances
demand it (see Section 7). We define basic β-likeness as follows.
DEFINITION 2 (BASIC β-LIKENESS). Given table DB with
sensitive attribute SA, let V = {v1, . . . , vm} be the SA domain,
and P = (p1, . . . , pm) the overall SA distribution in DB. An EC
G with SA distribution Q = (q1, . . . , qm) is said to satisfy basic
β-likeness, if and only if max{D(pi, qi)|pi ∈ P , pi < qi} ≤ β,
where β > 0 is a threshold.
For a table DB′ anonymized from table DB to obey β-like-
ness, all equivalence classes G ⊂ DB′ have to conform to β-like-
ness. Contrary to previous models [20, 3, 21, 27], basic β-likeness
clearly quantifies the relationship between the β threshold and pos-
itive information gain. Thanks to the maximum-distance threshold
it imposes, it inherently safeguards against skewness attacks and
semantic attacks [20]. Last, as it clearly distinguishes between pos-
itive and negative information gain, and accepts SA values absent
from an EC, it allows for more flexibility in anonymization, hence
higher information quality, than the closest related model, δ-dis-
closure-privacy [3]. Apart from specifying a maximum, instead of
a cumulative, distance threshold, we should also define the distance
function D in an appropriate manner. As we have argued, a measure
of absolute difference does not serve our purposes, since it fails to
protect less frequent SA values. We opt for relative difference in-
stead, and define the distance function as D(pi, qi) = qi−pipi . Thisfunction obeys the monotonicity property.
LEMMA 1 (MONOTONICITY PROPERTY). Assume that SA
value vi ∈ V has frequency pi in the overall table DB, q1i (q2i )
in EC G1 (G2), generated from tuples in DB, and q3i in G1 ∪ G2.
Then D(pi, q3i ) ≤ max{D(pi, q1i ),D(pi, q2i )}.
PROOF. Assume there are n1 (n2) tuples with vi in G1 (G2).
Then q1i = n1|G1| , q
2
i =
n2
|G2| , q
3
i =
n1+n2
|G1|+|G2| =
q1i |G1|+q2i |G2|
|G1|+|G2| ≤
max{q1i , q2i }. Thus, D(pi, q3i )≤max{D(pi, q1i ),D(pi, q2i )}.
The monotonicity property ensures that a union of two ECs yields
no larger distance between pi and qi than its united parts. Hence,
ECs violating β-likeness can be transformed to follow β-likeness
by merge operations. The relative distance function instantiates ba-
sic β-likeness by the constraint D(pi, qi) = qi−pipi ≤ β, where
pi and qi are the distributions of any SA value vi ∈ V in the
whole table and an EC, respectively. This constraint amounts to
an upper bound for the frequency of vi in any EC, qi, namely
qi ≤ (1 + β) · pi. Our relative distance function pays due at-
tention to less frequent SA values. However, this function provides
a meaningful frequency bound only if (1+β)·pi < 1; it then caters
for SA values whose frequency in DB is pi < 11+β . In our effort
to pay due attention to such less frequent values, we have discrimi-
nated against SA values of frequency larger than 1
1+β
. Such values
can assume frequency 1 in an EC. Thus, an adversary identifying
that a person’s record is within such an EC can infer the SA value of
that person with 100% confidence. The disclosure of such frequent
SA values may pose a privacy threat. To address this limitation, we
provide a stronger, enhanced definition of β-likeness.
DEFINITION 3 (ENHANCED β-LIKENESS). For table DB
with sensitive attribute SA, let V = {v1, . . . , vm} be the SA do-
main, and P = (p1, . . . , pm) the overall SA distribution in DB.
An EC G with SA distribution Q = (q1, . . . , qm) is said to sat-
isfy enhanced β-likeness, if and only if ∀qi, D(pi, qi) = qi−pipi ≤
min{β,− ln pi}, where β > 0 is a threshold and ln pi is the natu-
ral logarithm of pi.
The inequality constraint in the above definition implies that qi ≤
(1 + min{β,− ln pi}) · pi. We can then define the upper bound
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that enhanced β-likeness imposes on the frequency of vi in an EC
by function f(pi) = (1 + min{β,− ln pi}) · pi, which can be
decomposed as follows.
f(pi) =
{
pi (1 + β) , 0 < pi ≤ e−β
pi (1− ln pi) , e−β ≤ pi ≤ 1 (1)
The first segment of f(pi) is a linear, monotonically increasing
function of pi. The second segment is a concave, also monoton-
ically increasing function of pi, with derivative − ln pi. The two
segments meet at pi = e−β . In effect, f(pi) is a continuous,
monotonically increasing function of pi in (0, 1] with f(0) = 0
and f(1) = 1. Intuitively, the second segment bends the function’s
slope so as not to exceed the maximum value of 1. The monotonic-
ity of f(pi) implies that an EC G following the enhanced β-likeness
constraint obeys the following properties:
1. The maximum frequency of an SA value vi in G is less than
1, i.e., f(pi) < 1 for any pi < 1.
2. For two SA values vi and vℓ, such that pi < pℓ, the maxi-
mum allowed frequency of vi in G is less than that of vℓ, i.e.,
f(pi) < f(pℓ).
3. For an SA value vi that is ‘infrequent’ in table DB, with
pi ≤ e−β , its frequency in G is at most β times larger than
pi, i.e., qi ≤ f(pi) = (1 + β) · pi.
4. For an SA value vi that is ‘frequent’ in DB, with pi > e−β ,
its frequency in G is at most− ln pi times larger than pi, i.e.,
qi ≤ f(pi) = (1− ln pi) · pi < (1 + β) · pi.
These properties protect privacy for all SA values: infrequent
values receive due attention, while more frequent ones are disal-
lowed from assuming frequency values of 1. The β parameter
defines the privacy constraint for less frequent values, as well as
the frequency threshold e−β above which the privacy constraint as-
sumes a default form independent of β. This framework applies for
any monotonic upper-bound function. Our choice of ln pi is only
a convenient choice that confers the desirable properties. As en-
hanced β-likeness provides more robust privacy than basic β-like-
ness, in the following we focus on it. Unless otherwise specified,
henceforth by β-likeness we mean its enhanced form.
While (enhanced) β-likeness defines only an upper bound on qi,
the cognate δ-disclosure-privacy model [3] amounts to two bounds
on qi, demanding that
∣∣∣log( qipi )∣∣∣ < δ, or, equivalently, e−δ · pi <
qi < e
δ · pi. Furthermore, there is a fundamental conceptual dif-
ference between β-likeness and δ-disclosure-privacy: the former
always disallows qi values equal to 0, and can allow qi values arbi-
trarily close to 1 (as its upper bound can assume values larger than
1), while the latter allows any qi value less than pi, but always dis-
allows qi values equal to 1 (its upper bound being strictly less than
1). We argue that both these choices are more reasonable than those
made by δ-disclosure-privacy. Moreover, we re-iterate that the in-
troduction of δ-disclosure-privacy in [3] was not accompanied by
an anonymization algorithm tailored therefor; the model was only
used as a tool to argue for a negative result, namely that existing
k-anonymization algorithms [18], adapted to δ-disclosure-privacy,
yield unacceptably high information loss [3]. In contrast, our work
aims at a positive result.
4. GENERALIZATION-BASED SCHEME
In this section we first introduce the metrics to measure the in-
formation loss by the generalization. Then we present an obser-
vation, which motivates our algorithm. After that, we design our
generalization-based algorithm customized for β-likeness.
Nervous and
circulatory  diseases
Nervous
diseases
Epilepsy Brain 
tumors
Headache
Circulatory
diseases
Anemia Angina Heart 
murmur
Figure 1: Domain hierarchy for diseases
4.1 Information Loss Metrics
To solve the problem posed by the β-likeness model, we need to
fulfill the β constraint while giving up little information. We use an
information loss metric to assess the amount of information ceded
for the sake of privacy. Different utility objectives would require
different metrics. When the purpose the data is to be used for is not
known in advance, a general metric can be used, as in [12].
Assume a set of QI attributes QI = {A1,. . ., Ad} and an EC
G. Given a numerical attribute NA ∈ QI , let [LNA, UNA] be its
domain and [lGNA, uGNA] the (generalized) range of its values in G;
then the information loss (IL) regarding NA in G is:
ILNA(G) = u
G
NA − lGNA
UNA − LNA (2)
Given a categorical attribute CA, we surmise a generalization
hierarchyHCA on its domain (Fig. 1). Let a be the lowest common
ancestor of all CA values in G; then, the IL regarding CA in G is:
ILCA(G) =
{
0, |leaves(a)| = 1
|leaves(a)|
|leaves(HCA)| , otherwise
(3)
where leaves(a) is the set of leaves under a, and leaves(HCA)
the set of all leaves in HCA. Then the total IL of G is:
IL(G) =
d∑
i=1
wi × ILAi(G) (4)
where wi is a weight for Ai, with
∑d
i=1 wi = 1. In our exper-
iments we set wi = 1d . The Average Information Loss on a tableDB, published as a collection of ECs SG , is:
AIL(SG) =
∑
G∈SG |G| × IL(G)
|DB| (5)
We aim to attain β-likeness on DB at a low value of AIL(SG).
4.2 An Observation
The intuition behind our generalization-based method emanates
from the following observation. Assume DB is partitioned into a
set of buckets by a ‘group-by’ on SA. If we form ECs by selecting
from each bucket a number of tuples proportional to its size, then
the SA distribution in the formed EC will be the same as the global
distribution. On the other hand, if we partition DB into buckets
allowing (all tuples of) more than one SA value per bucket, and
then form ECs in a similar fashion, then there will be some vari-
ation in SA distributions among ECs. We aim to configure this
process so as to allow for such variation to the extent permitted by
the β constraint. An akin methodology is followed in SABRE [4],
an algorithm for the t-closeness model. Yet, unfortunately, SABRE
cannot be applied on other distribution-based models, as it caters to
the particular requirements of t-closeness, looking at the semantic
distance between SA values in order to bound the EMD-difference
of distributions between each EC and the overall table. In contrast,
our algorithm should bound the variation in each SA value’s fre-
quency. The following two definitions clarify our intuition.
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DEFINITION 4. Given a table DB with sensitive attribute SA,
a set of buckets ϕ forms an exact bucket partition of DB iff⋃
∀B∈ϕ B = DB, while each SA value (tuple) appears in exactly
one bucket.
DEFINITION 5 (PROPORTIONALITY CONDITION). Letϕ be a
bucket partition ofDB. Assume that an EC, G, is formed with xj tu-
ples from bucket Bj ∈ ϕ, j = 1, 2, . . . , |ϕ|. G abides to the propor-
tionality condition with respect to ϕ, iff the values xj are propor-
tional to |Bj |, i.e., x1 : x2 : · · · : x|ϕ| = |B1| : |B2| : · · · : |B|ϕ||.
Age
weight50 60 70 80
40
70
60
50
Disease
Headache
Angina
Anemia
Brain tumors
Epilepsy
Heart murmur
2
12
1
1
2
Figure 2: Improved information quality
EXAMPLE 1. Consider Table 1, where {weight, age} is the
QI , and disease is the SA. The diagram in Figure 2 shows the
QI-space and the distribution of tuples, with each QI attribute cor-
responding to a dimension. A bucket partition ϕ of this table could
consist of six buckets of one tuple each, with SA values headache,
epilepsy, brain tumors, anemia, angina, and heart murmur, respec-
tively. Taking one tuple from each of those, we could build a single
EC satisfying 0-likeness. Still, such an EC covers the entire QI-
space, incurring high information loss. An alternative bucket par-
tition could consist of three two-tuple buckets, ϕ = {B1,B2,B3},
with headache and epilepsy in bucket B1, brain tumors and ane-
mia in B2, and the rest in B3. We can then build two ECs, taking
one tuple from each bucket, as shown in Figure 2. Tuples in the
same EC are labeled by the same number in the figure. This parti-
tioning achieves better information quality, as the areas of ECs in
QI-space are smaller.
While the bucket partition in the above example enables higher
information quality, it no longer abides by 0-likeness. Still, it sat-
isfies β-likeness, for β ≥ 1, with respect to Table 1. In general,
it suffices to create ECs so that they attain β-likeness for a given
β > 0. We propose an algorithm that does so in two phases: it first
partitions tuples into buckets, and then determines the number of
tuples each EC needs to draw from each bucket.
4.3 Bucketization Phase
Let the SA domain be V= {v1, v2,. . ., vm} and the overall dis-
tribution of SA values P = (p1, p2,. . ., pm). We partition V into
subsets, and use them to divideDB into a bucket partition ϕ; all tu-
ples in DB with SA values in the same subset of V are pushed to a
single bucket of ϕ. Assume EC G draws xj tuples from bucket
Bj ∈ ϕ, j = 1, 2,. . ., |ϕ|, and let Vj be the subset of SA val-
ues in Bj . Then, in the worst case, all xj tuples may have the
least frequent SA value in Vj , vℓj , with pℓj = minvi∈Vj{pi},
hence the frequency of vℓj in G will be qℓj = xj|G| ; β-likeness
should hold in this case too, i.e., it should be xj|G| ≤ f(pℓj ) =
(1+min{β,−ln(pℓj )})·pℓj , as the following theorem defines.
THEOREM 1 (ELIGIBILITY CONDITION). Let ϕ be a bucket
partition of DB with sensitive attribute SA, G an EC formed with
xj tuples from bucket Bj ∈ ϕ, Vj the set of SA values in Bj , and
pℓj = minvi∈Vj{pi}, j = 1, 2, . . . , |ϕ|. If ∀j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |ϕ|},
xj
|G| ≤ f(pℓj ), then G follows β-likeness.
PROOF. For any SA value vk ∈ V , let Bj ∈ ϕ be the single
bucket that contains tuples in DB with vk as their SA value, hence
vk ∈ Vj . Since G draws xj tuples from Bj , the frequency of vk
in G is qk ≤ xj|G| ≤ f(pℓj )≤ f(pk). Expanding to all vk ∈ V , we
conclude that G follows β-likeness.
Theorem 1 defines the eligibility condition for an EC to follow
β-likeness. However, it does not provide a way to specify a par-
ticular number of tuples xj to choose from a given bucket Bj , i.e.,
it offers no guidance on how to construct a β-likeness-complying
anonymization. To overcome this lack of guidance, we assume that
ECs are formed following the proportionality condition. Under this
assumption, it holds that xj|G| =
|Bj|
|DB| =
∑
vi∈Vj pi, and the next
lemma can be easily deduced from Theorem 1.
LEMMA 2. Let G be an EC that follows the proportionality
condition with respect to a bucket partition ϕ of DB with sensi-
tive attribute SA, Vj the set of SA values in bucket Bj ∈ ϕ, and
pℓj = minvi∈Vj{pi}, j = 1, 2,. . . ,|ϕ|. If ∀j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |ϕ|},∑
vi∈Vj pi ≤ f(pℓj ), then G follows β-likeness.
Lemma 2 defines the condition that the frequencies of a subset of
SA values Vj ⊂ V should obey, so that, if all values in Vj are put in
the same bucket Bj by a bucket partition ϕ, then ECs obeying the
proportionality condition with respect to ϕ satisfy β-likeness. This
condition is trivially satisfied by a strict partition having a single
SA value per bucket. We aim at a looser bucket partition that sat-
isfies the condition of Lemma 2 in a non-trivial manner, with more
than one distinct SA values per bucket (as in Example 1).
Function DPpartition(DB, SA)
Let V = {v1, v2, . . . , vm}, P = (p1, p2, . . . , pm);1
Assume that pn ≤ pn+1, where n = 1, 2, . . . ,m− 1;2
N [0] = 0;3
S[0] = 0;4
for e=1 to m do5
N [e] = N [e− 1] + 1;6
S[e] = e;7
b = e− 1;8
while b > 0 and Combinable(b, e) = true do9
ifN [b− 1] + 1 < N [e] then10
N [e] = N [b− 1] + 1;11
S[e] = b;12
b = b− 1;13
Initialize ϕ to be empty;14
e = m;15
while e > 0 do16
b = S[e];17
Create bucket B, having tuples with SA values in {vb, vb+1, . . . , ve};18
ϕ = ϕ ∪ {B};19
e = S[e]− 1;20
Return ϕ;21
We develop a bucketization scheme for this task. We start out
by representing, P , the set of SA frequencies in DB, in ascend-
ing order, pi ≤ pi+1, i = 1, . . . ,m− 1. By Lemma 2, a set
of consecutive SA values in V , vb, vb+1, . . . , ve, are allowed to
be in the same bucket provided that
∑e
i=b pi < f(pℓ), where
pℓ = min{pb, pb+1, . . . , pe}. Our scheme, presented in Function
DPpartition, partitions V by dynamic programming, so as to mini-
mize the number of buckets. LetN [e] denote the minimum number
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of buckets to which we can partition the prefix of e elements in V ,
i.e., v1, v2, . . . , ve. The value of N [e] is calculated recursively as:
N [e] = min
{b|Combinable(b,e)=true}
{N [b− 1]}+ 1 (6)
Function Combinable(b, e) checks whether SA values vb, . . . , ve
can make a bucket, i.e., whether
∑e
i=b pi < f(pℓ), where pℓ =
min{pb, pb+1, . . . , pe}. The DP base is N [0] = 0.
DPpartition has two parts. The first part (steps 3-13) runs the DP
recursion of Equation 6 to evaluate the final minimum value N [m]
and split V into segments accordingly; thereby, it needs to assess
the combinability ofm2 potential buckets. To assess combinability,
we maintain the running
∑
pi within a bucket, updated in O(1) at
each step; the min{pi} within a bucket is its first element. The
complexity of this part is O(m2). The second part (steps 14-20)
uses the first-part results to build the bucket partition. Tuples with
the SA values in the same segment make a bucket (step 18), in
O(|DB|). The overall time complexity is O(m2 + |DB|).
4.4 Reallocation Phase
The bucketization phase of our scheme delivers a bucket parti-
tion ϕ of DB. We have so far assumed that ECs are formed from
ϕ following the proportionality condition. However, a strict ad-
herence to this condition may result in large ECs, incurring high
information loss. For example, if the size of some bucket Bj ∈ϕ is
a prime number (other than 2), then, to strictly follow the propor-
tionality condition, we should form an EC out of the whole table.
We should rather relax the condition: it should suffice that the num-
ber of tuples xj chosen from bucket Bj in EC G be approximately
proportional to the size of Bj , i.e., xj|G| ≈
|Bj|
|DB| =
∑
vi∈Vj pi. The
rationale for this relaxation is as follows: the bucket partition ϕ re-
turned by DPpartition obeys the inequality
∑
vi∈Vj pi ≤ f(pℓj )
(Lemma 2). Then, if xj|G| ≈
∑
vi∈Vj pi (i.e., if we draw tuples into
ECs approximately proportionally to the size of the bucket they hail
from), then the eligibility condition xj|G| ≤f(pℓj ) (Theorem 1), and
therefore β-likeness, will be still easily achievable.
To ensure β-likeness, we determine the EC sizes by construct-
ing a binary tree, the ECTree, in a top-down fashion. We start
with a bucket partition ϕ = {B1, . . . ,B|ϕ|}. The root of the tree
r represents a potential EC that contains all tuples in DB, i.e.,
|Bj | tuples from bucket Bj . We denote these contents as r =[|B1|, . . . , |B|ϕ||]. This can be a valid EC, but we prefer smaller
ones. Thus, we proceed to split r into two children (each rep-
resenting an EC), dividing each Bj into B1j and B2j . The root’s
left child cL contains B1j and the right child cR contains B2j , j =
1, 2, . . . , |ϕ|. To ensure that B1j and B2j have approximately the
same size, we set |B1j | = round
( |Bj|
2
)
and |B2j | = |Bj | − |B1j |.
The split is allowed only if both cL and cR satisfy the eligibility
condition (Theorem 1), hence can form ECs satisfying β-likeness.
Assume the left child of r is cL =
[|B11 |, . . . , |B1|ϕ||]. Then, for the
eligibility condition to be satisfied, it should hold that |B
1
j |∑|ϕ|
n=1 |B1n|
≤
f(pℓj ). An analogous condition applies for cR. If splitting r into
cL and cR is allowed, we proceed to check whether we can split
cL and cR themselves. When no node can be split further, we
get a final ECTree, in which each leaf node configures the number
of tuples an EC should get from each bucket. A simple function,
biSplit(ϕ), returns the list of leaf nodes. Example 2 illustrates this
process.
EXAMPLE 2. Let disease be a categorical SA with the domain
hierarchy of Figure 1. Consider a table, containing 2 tuples with
headache, 3 with epilepsy, 3 with brain tumors, 3 with ane-
mia, 4 with angina, and 4 with heart murmur. Assume β =
2. The overall SA distribution is P = (p1, p2, p3, p4, p5, p6) =
( 2
19
, 3
19
, 3
19
, 3
19
, 4
19
, 4
19
). f(p1)≈ 0.31, f(p2)= f(p3)= f(p4) ≈
0.45, and f(p5) = f(p6)≈ 0.54. The bucketization phase returns
a bucket partition of the table, ϕ = {B1, B2, B3}, where B1 ac-
commodates tuples with SA values headache and epilepsy, B2
brain tumors and anemia, and B3 the remaining two. The root
node r= [5, 6, 8] in Figure 3 represents an EC with 5 tuples from
B1, 6 from B2, and 8 from B3 (i.e., all tuples in the table). We
split r into c1 = [2, 3, 4] and c2 = [3, 3, 4]. Then EC c1 has size
9, and contains 2 tuples from B1 with 29 < min{f(p1), f(p2)},
3 from B2 with 39 < min{f(p3), f(p4)}, and 4 from B3 with
4
9
< min{f(p5), f(p6)}. Thus, c1 obeys the eligibility condition
(Theorem 1). Likewise, c2 also satisfies the condition. Thus, split-
ting r into c1 and c2 is allowed. Recursively, we can split c1 into
[1, 1, 2] and [1, 2, 2]. When we try to split c2 into g1 = [1, 1, 2]
and g2 = [2, 2, 2], we find that g2 does not satisfy the eligibility
condition, as 2
6
> min{f(p1), f(p2)}, hence this split is not al-
lowed. Figure 3 shows the final tree, with each leaf node indicating
the number of tuples an EC should draw from each bucket. In the
general case, an EC could also draw 0 tuples from some bucket.
[5, 6, 8]
[1, 1, 2]
[3, 3, 4][2, 3, 4]
[1, 2, 2]
Figure 3: Dynamic EC size determination
4.5 BUREL
We now put the above phases together to devise BUREL, an al-
gorithm that BUcketizes tuples into buckets and REallocates them
from buckets to ECs so as to attain β-Likeness. The distinctive and
novel feature of this algorithm, as opposed to algorithms for k-ano-
nymity, ℓ-diversity, and t-closeness, is that it distinguishes among
SA values by their frequencies and builds its operation and reason-
ing around this frequency-based partitioning.
The bucketization phase of BUREL returns ϕ, a bucket parti-
tion of DB (step 2). Then, its reallocation phase (function biSplit)
determines the number of tuples each EC should draw from each
bucket at a leaf of the ECTree and returns a list of arrays Sa con-
taining these size values (step 3). Specific ECs following the pre-
scribed sizes are then materialized (steps 4-9). Given an array
a ∈ Sa, BUREL retrieves aj tuples from Bj ∈ ϕ, where aj is
the jth element of a and j=1, 2,. . . ,|ϕ|, and forms an EC G out of
them (steps 6-8).
Algorithm: BUREL ( DB, SA, β )
Let {v1, v2, . . . , vm} be all the SA values in DB, and1
{p1, p2, . . . , pm} be their distributions;
ϕ = DPpartition(DB,SA);2
Sa = biSplit(ϕ);3
foreach array a in Sa do4
Create an empty EC, say G;5
foreach aj , jth element of a do6
ecj = Retrieve(Bj , aj);7
add ecj to G;8
Output G;9
When retrieving tuples from buckets, BUREL is indifferent to
their SA values. The β-likeness between a constructed EC G and
the whole table DB is guaranteed by Theorem 1; tuple selection is
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guided by information loss considerations, as prescribed by our in-
formation loss metric (Section 4.1). This metric requires the Mini-
mum Bounding Boxes of ECs to be small. Accordingly, we employ
function Retrieve(Bi, ai) (step 7), which greedily picks tuples of
similar QI values. This greedy selection of nearby tuples works as
follows: We define a multidimensional space with eachQI attribute
as a dimension. The mapping to such a QI-space for a numeri-
cal QI attribute NA is straightforward. The axis of a categorical
QI attribute CA is formed by the order provided by a pre-order
traversal of the leaves in its domain hierarchy HCA. Each tuple is
represented as a point in this QI-space. When forming an EC G,
BUREL first randomly picks a tuple x from a bucket of ϕ in G, and
then finds the aj nearest neighbors (by Euclidean distance) of x in
each bucket Bj , j = 1, 2,. . . ,|ϕ|, and adds them into G, until the
size specifications are satisfied. Still, this process can be computa-
tionally demanding even with an index structure [8]. Thus, we de-
vise an efficient heuristic using the Hilbert curve [24], a continuous
fractal that maps regions of QI-space, hence tuples, to 1D Hilbert
values. Tuples close in QI-space are likely to have nearby Hilbert
values. BUREL sorts tuples in Bj by their Hilbert values, and uses
this order to select the aj nearest neighbors of a tuple x within each
bucket. We find the nearest Hilbert-neighbor x¯ of x within bucket
Bj by binary search, and then expand to the next closest aj neigh-
bors to x. The average time complexity for this search operation is
O
(|SG ||ϕ|·(log |DB||ϕ| + |DB||SG||ϕ|)), where |ϕ| is the number of buckets,
|DB|
|ϕ| the average size of a bucket, and
|DB|
|SG ||ϕ| the average number
of tuples drawn from a bucket to form an EC.
5. PERTURBATION-BASED SCHEME
Our generalization-based solution, achieves β-likeness and also
provides identity anonymity, like all generalization-based methods
do. However, in case a data set contains a few remote outliers,
these outliers may force a highly unsatisfactory solution by gener-
alization. Similarly unsatisfactory solutions can be obtained in case
of extremely infrequent SA values. For example, consider a dataset
DB, in which only one tuple t has SA value v. Then, to attain 1-
likeness, we would have to create an EC containing t and at least
half of the tuples in DB. We deduce that an alternative solution
is desirable in order to handle such irregular cases, even at the ex-
pense of identity anonymity. To that end, we propose an approach
that anonymizes each tuple independently by perturbing SA values
while preserving QI values intact. We reiterate that, for a given
SA value vi, β-likeness considers its frequency in the whole table,
pi, as prior confidence, and constrains an adversary’s information
gain on vi after seeing the published data, bounding the posterior
confidence. We aim to achieve this target by perturbing SA val-
ues only; our scheme resembles a randomized response procedure,
albeit having a different perturbation probability for each SA value.
DEFINITION 6 (β-LIKENESS BY PERTURBATION). Given a ta-
ble DB with sensitive attribute SA, let V = {v1, . . . , vm} be the
SA domain, and P = (p1, . . . , pm) the overall SA distribution in
DB. A perturbation on DB that randomizes SA values satisfies
β-likeness, iff the adversarial posterior confidence in vi ∈ V after
seeing the randomized data is at most f(pi), i = 1, 2, . . . , m.
To build a solution that achieves β-likeness by perturbation, we
adapt the concept of upward (ρ1, ρ2)-privacy [10] as follows.
DEFINITION 7 ((ρ1i, ρ2i)-PRIVACY). Let vi ∈ V be an orig-
inal SA value, and v ∈ V be any SA value after perturbation. We
say that (ρ1i, ρ2i)-privacy is satisfied on vi, iff the adversarial prior
confidence in vi is C(U = vi) = ρ1i, and the posterior confidence
after seeing v is C(U = vi|V = v) ≤ ρ2i.
While (ρ1, ρ2)-privacy does not distinguish among SA values,
our adaptation does. Given these definitions, we can achieve β-
likeness by setting ρ1i = pi and ρ2i = f(pi) for each vi ∈ V .
THEOREM 2. Let vi∈V be an original SA value, and v∈V be
an SA value after perturbation, such that ∃u∈V: Pr(u→ v)>0,
where u→v denotes that u has been perturbed to v. If it holds that
∀vj ∈ V : Pr(vi → v)
Pr(vj → v) ≤
ρ2i
ρ1i
· 1− ρ1i
1− ρ2i = γi (7)
then (ρ1i, ρ2i)-privacy is satisfied with ρ1i = C(U = vi) > 0.
PROOF. Assume that (ρ1i, ρ2i)-privacy is not satisfied, that is,
C(U = vi|V = v) > ρ2i. For the event of seeing v it holds that
C(V = v) =
∑
∀u∈V C(U = u) ·Pr(u→ v) > 0, as v must have
been produced by some original value u. Let vj be an SA value
least likely to have been perturbed to v, i.e.:
vj ∈ {u ∈ V|Pr(u→ v) = min
u′∈V
Pr(u′ → v)}
By the definition of conditional probability it holds that:
C(U = vi|V = v) = C(U = vi) · Pr(vi → v)
C(V = v)
(8)
and, since vj is least likely to have yielded v, it is:
C(U 6= vi|V = v) ≥ C(U 6= vi) · Pr(vj → v)
C(V = v)
(9)
Since, by our assumption, C(U = vi|V = v) > ρ2i > 0 and
C(U = vi) = ρ1i > 0, from Eqs. (8) and (9) we get:
C(U 6= vi|V = v)
C(U = vi|V = v) ≥
Pr(vj → v)
Pr(vi → v) ·
C(U 6= vi)
C(U = vi)
(10)
Inequality (7) holds for vj , thus we can rewrite Inequality (10) as:
1− C(U = vi|V = v)
C(U = vi|V = v) ≥
1
γi
· 1− C(U = vi)
C(U = vi)
(11)
Still, 1−C(U=vi)C(U=vi) =
1−ρ1i
ρ1i
, hence Inequality (11) yields:
1− C(U = vi|V = v)
C(U = vi|V = v) ≥
1
γi
· 1− ρ1i
ρ1i
=
1− ρ2i
ρ2i
⇒
C(U = vi|V = v) ≤ ρ2i
which contradicts our assumption.
Due to Theorem 2, Inequality (7) provides a sufficient condition
for β-likeness to hold. We aim to achieve this condition by uniform
perturbation, which maximizes the utility of randomized data [2].
Given an input SA value vi∈V , uniform perturbation tosses a coin
with probability αi∈(0, 1] for heads and 1−αi for tails, and, in the
latter case, replaces vi by a randomly selected value v ∈ V . Then:
Pr(vi → v) =
{
αi + (1− αi)/m if vi = v
(1− αi)/m if vi 6= v (12)
LEMMA 3. Given any perturbed value v, Pr(vi → v) is maxi-
mized when vi = v.
PROOF. By Equation 12, if vi = v, then Pr(vi → v) = αi +
(1 − αi)/m. For vj 6= v, Pr(vj → v) = 1−αjm . Since ai, aj ∈
(0, 1] it is Pr(vi→v)−Pr(vj→v) = (m−1)·αi+αjm > 0.
For the sake of utility, we need to maximize the probability that
input SA values remain unchanged, i.e., to set αi as high as pos-
sible for each vi ∈ V . However, for a given vi, the value of αi
should allow Inequality (7) to hold for v=vi and for any vj 6=v; if
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it holds in these extreme cases, then it also holds for all other values
of variables v and vj . Substituting the values given by Equation 12
for v= vi and vj 6= v in Inequality (7), we get αi+(1−αi)/m(1−αj)/m ≤ γi
∀j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} \ {i}. The worst-case value the denominator
in the last inequality (i.e., the probability Pr(vj→v) of perturbing
vj 6= v to v) can assume is CM =minmh=1
{
1−αh
m
}
. To calculate a
bound for αi, we require that the inequality holds in the worst case:
αi + (1− αi)/m
CM
≤ γi ⇔ (13)
αi ≤ m · γi · CM − 1
m− 1 (14)
Since by definition CM ≤ 1−αim , if Inequality (13) holds, then,
for a given i, it will hold that αi+(1−αi)/m
(1−αi)/m ≤ γi; consequently, it
will be αi≤ γi−1γi+m−1 . Using this upper bound of αi, we infer that,
for each i ∈ {1, 2,. . .,m} it will be 1−αi
m
≥ 1
γi+m−1 . In effect, it
should also be CM =minmh=1
{
1−αh
m
}≥minmh=1 { 1γh+m−1}=
1
γℓ+m−1 , where γℓ=max
m
h=1{γh}. We have thus derived a lower
bound for Pr(vj → v) with vj 6= v, namely CLM = 1γℓ+m−1 . To
ensure that Inequality (14) always holds, we must guarantee that it
also holds for the lower-bound case; thus, the highest value we can
safely assign to each αi is αi= m·γi ·C
L
M−1
m−1 . Eventually:
THEOREM 3. Perturbation by Eq. (12) with αi= m·γi·C
L
M−1
m−1 ,
γi=
ρ2i
ρ1i
· 1−ρ1i
1−ρ2i , ρ1i=pi, ρ2i=f(pi), ∀vi∈V , satisfies β-likeness.
PROOF. Due to Lemma 3, for any SA value vj , perturbation by
Eq. (12) gives Pr(vi→v)
Pr(vj→v) ≤
αi+(1−αi)/m
CL
M
= γi, i = 1, 2, . . . , m.
Then, by Theorem 2, (ρ1i, ρ2i)-privacy holds ∀vi ∈ V , hence β-
likeness is satisfied.
We now discuss how we reconstruct the original SA distribution
from the perturbed data to answer aggregation queries, which are a
basis of data mining tasks, as the following [33]:
SELECT COUNT(*) FROM Anonymized-data
WHERE pred(A1) AND . . . AND pred(Aλ)
AND pred(SA)
This query has predicates on λ randomly selected QI attributes and
the SA. For each of these λ+1 attributes A, pred(A) has the form
of A∈RA, where RA is an arbitrary interval in the domain of A.
Perturbation does not affectQI values. We reconstruct the query’s
result by estimating the count of original SA values among those
tuples that satisfy the query’s QI predicates, given the observed
SA values. In particular, given an aggregation query, suppose that
St is the set of tuples satisfying the predicates associated with QI
attributes, A1∈RA1 AND . . . AND Aλ∈RAλ . Let S ′t be the per-
turbed form of St. Since perturbation randomizes only SA values,
each tuple in St is perturbed in S ′t with its QI value unchanged. Let
ni be the number of tuples with SA value vi in St, i = 1, 2, . . . , m,
and ei =
∑m
j=1 Pr(vj→vi)·nj the expected number of instances
of vi in S ′t. According to our previous discussion, if j = i, then
Pr(vj→ vi) = γi · CLM , else Pr(vj → vi)= 1−γj ·C
L
M
m−1 . Using the
notationXi = γi·CLM and Yj = 1−γj ·C
L
M
m−1 , we haveE = PM×N ,
where E =<e1, e2, . . . , em>, N =<n1, n2, . . . , nm>, and
PM =

X1 Y2 . . . Ym
Y1 X2 . . . Ym
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Y1 Y2 . . . Xm

A data recipient knows neither E nor N , but only observes E′ =<
e′1, e
′
2, . . . , e
′
m >, where e′i is the number of occurrences of SA
value vi in S ′t. Thus, one can approximately reconstruct N asN ′ =
PM−1 × E′ =< n′1, n′2, . . . , n′m >, and estimate the answer to
a given query as est =
∑
vi∈RSA n
′
i, where RSA is the query
interval of pred(SA). To facilitate this reconstruction process, we
publish the perturbed data along with matrix PM ; we can also
release the original global SA distribution P in order to render the
publication model comparable to that offered by generalization.
6. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section we evaluate our schemes. Our prototypes were im-
plemented in Java and the experiments ran on a Core2 Duo 2.33GHz
CPU machine with 4GB RAM running Windows XP. We use the
CENSUS dataset [1], which contains 500,000 tuples on 6 attributes
as shown in Table 3. For categorical attributes, the value following
the type is the height of the corresponding attribute hierarchy; for
instance, attribute marital status is categorical and has a hierarchy
of height 2. The first 5 attributes are potential QI-attributes; the last
(salary class) is the SA. By default, we take the first three attributes
as QI . The least frequent SA value is 49, with frequency 0.2018%;
the most frequent SA value is 12, with frequency 4.8402%; β = 1
produces frequency threshold e−β ≈ 37%, which marks all SA
values as ‘infrequent’, and allows the frequency of any SA value in
any EC to be at most 4.8402% × 2 = 9.7%. Thus, 1 is a small β
value. We use β ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. We generate 5 microdata tables
by randomly picking 100K to 500K tuples from the dataset; the
one of 500K tuples is our default dataset.
Attribute Cardinality Type
Age 79 numerical
Gender 2 categorical (1)
Education Level 17 numerical
Marital Status 6 categorical (2)
Work Class 10 categorical (3)
Salary Class 50 sensitive attribute
Table 3: The CENSUS dataset
We set the likeness threshold β by default to 4. Then, given the
application of enhanced β-likeness for any SA value vi, if pi ≤
e−4 = 0.018, its frequency qi in any EC should not exceed 5pi; if
pi > 1.8%, then it should be qi ≤ (1− ln(pi)) · pi. We reiterate
that these bounds apply to each SA value, while their definition
accommodates both low-frequency and high-frequency values. The
highest SA value frequency in our data set does not exceed 5%, so
the frequency of any salary class in any EC will not exceed 20%.
6.1 Face-to-face with t-closeness
Our first task is to compare our new β-likeness privacy model to
the predecessor distribution-based model of t-closeness. We argue
that β-likeness provides a more informative and comprehensible
privacy guarantee than t-closeness does. Still, in order to create an
even playing field on which to compare β-likeness to t-closeness,
we conducted three face-to-face comparisons as follows.
In the first comparison, for a given dataset DB and β, we let
BUREL transform DB to DBβ , satisfying β-likeness. We then
measure the closeness tβ , by the t-closeness model, between DBβ
and DB, i.e., the maximum EMD of the SA distribution in an EC
of DBβ from its distribution in DB. We then apply t-closeness
schemes tMondrian [20] and SABRE [4] on DB as well, with
tβ as the t-closeness threshold, to produce DBMtβ and DBStβ , re-
spectively. Then DBβ , DBMtβ , and DBStβ achieve the same privacy
under the criterion of t-closeness, as expressed by tβ . Then we
measure the β value achieved by DBMtβ and DBStβ with respect
to DB. Given that all three schemes achieve the same privacy in
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Figure 4: Comparison to t-closeness
terms of t-closeness, we are interested to compare the privacy they
ahieve in terms of β-likeness. Figure 4(a) shows the results (in log-
arithmic y-axes), as a function of the given β parameter. While all
the three schemes are tuned to ensure the same t-closeness guaran-
tee, BUREL provides consistently higher privacy by the criterion
of β-likeness than SABRE and tMondrian. This result is expected,
since t-closeness restricts only the cumulative difference between
SA distributions, indifferent to the relative frequency difference of
each individual SA value between an EC and the whole table.
Next, for a given dataset DB and closeness constraint t, we let
tMondrian (SABRE) transform DB to DBMt (DBSt ), attaining t-
closeness. We then let BUREL find, by binary search, a value βt,
such that, when it enforces βt-likeness on DB, it produces an ano-
nymization DBβt characterized by the same (or smaller) closeness
parameter t as DBMt (DBSt ). Again we get three anonymized ver-
sions ofDB that achieve the same privacy under t-closeness. While
in our first comparison we arrived at this state starting out with a
β parameter, now we start out with a t parameter. Thus, we avoid
bias against t-closeness schemes. We now compare the β-likeness
achieved by DBMt (DBSt ) to that of DBβt , as a function of t. The
results, shown in Figure 4(b), reaffirm our previous findings.
In our last experiment, given an AIL value l, we let BUREL
determine, by binary search on its β threshold, a value βl, such
that the data set DBβl it generates from DB with βl as the like-
ness threshold achieves AIL equal to (or smaller than) l. Likewise,
we determine, by binary search, a value tMl (tSl ), which, used as
the closeness threshold in tMondrian (SABRE), generates data set
DBtM
l
(DBtS
l
) with AIL near l too, allowing for a small difference
ǫ. Thus, we obtain three data setsDBβl ,DBtMl , and DBtSl , gener-
ated by BUREL, tMondrian, and SABRE, respectively, which all
have information loss near l; to ensure the comparison is not biased
in favor of BUREL, we ensure its AIL value is not greater than
those of the other algorithms. We then compare the privacy they
achieve in terms of β-likeness. Figure 4(c) shows the results. Not
surprisingly, BUREL provides the highest privacy again, followed
by SABRE and tMondrian.
Our results testify that, other factors being equal, state-of-the-
art t-closeness schemes fail by a wide margin (as indicated by the
logarithmic y-axes) to achieve privacy good in terms of β-likeness.
Thus, they reaffirm that β-likeness raises substantially different re-
quirements from t-closeness, and requires a different approach.
6.2 Evaluation on Generalization
In this section we evaluate the performance of BUREL as a β-
likeness algorithm in its own field. As there is no previous work
on β-likeness, we employ two comparison benchmarks adopting
some suggestions of related work. First, we devise an algorithm
for β-likeness, following the conventional wisdom on designing
algorithms for new privacy models: We adapt Mondrian [18], a
k-anonymization algorithm, to the purposes of β-likeness, as pre-
vious works have done for other privacy models [22, 20, 3, 21].
Our adaptation, LMondrian, splits an EC only if both resultant ECs
satisfy β-likeness. Second, we use the similar adaptation of Mon-
drian to δ-disclosure-privacy suggested in [3], DMondrian. To ren-
der DMondrian comparable to BUREL and LMondrian, we set the
value of δ so that the data anonymized by DMondrian obey β-like-
ness. As we have discussed, while β-likeness demands that an SA
value’s distribution in an EC be qi≤ (1+min{β,−ln pi})·pi, for
a given β, δ-disclosure-privacy requires that e−δ ·pi<qi < eδ ·pi,
where pi is the overall distribution of vi in the whole dataset. Thus,
an algorithm for δ-disclosure-privacy achieves β-likeness for δ ≤
log(1+min{β,−ln pi}), for all pi; in view of all SA values in V ,
we set δ= log
(
1+min
{
β,−ln
(
max
vi∈V
{pi}
)})
. We first com-
pare the three schemes with respect to average information loss and
wall-clock time.
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Figure 5: Effect of varying β
First, we study performance as a function of the β threshold.
Figure 5 shows the results. As β grows, the constraint on the
relative difference of each SA (i.e., salary) value frequency be-
tween an EC and the overall table is relaxed, hence information
quality rises (Figure 5(a)). BUREL outperforms both LMondrian
and DMondrian in information quality, showing the benefit of a
scheme tailored for β-likeness. This result reconfirms the finding of
[3] that a k-anonymization algorithm, adapted to δ-disclosure-pri-
vacy, yields unacceptably high information loss; as we discussed,
we aim at a positive result and propose a better alternative. In ad-
dition, given that δ-disclosure-privacy overprotects data by impos-
ing a constraint on negative information gain, LMondrian performs
better than its stricter sibling, DMondrian. Remarkably, BUREL
also outpaces both Mondrian-based schemes in efficiency (Figure
5(b)). Overall, BUREL achieves almost half the information loss
of its Mondrian-based competitors in about half the time.
Next, we investigate the effect of QI dimensionality (size), vary-
ing it from 1 to 5. As QI dimensionality increases, the data become
more sparse inQI space, as more high-dimensional degrees of free-
dom are offered; thus, the formed ECs are more likely to have large
minimum bounding boxes, and information quality degrades, as
Figure 6(a) shows. The information loss of BUREL is again lower
than that of the Mondrian-based methods. In addition, BUREL is
again the fastest of the three (Figure 6(b)).
Our next experiment studies the effect of database size, varying
the size of the microdata table from 100K to 500K tuples. Figure
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7 presents our results. Interestingly, data size has no clear effect
on information quality. This is due to the fact that, as the amount
of tuples grows, more sensitive values are revealed, imposing their
own requirements. The mere increase of data density does not help,
as it would with simpler models like k-anonymity. Still, the elapsed
time increases as the table size grows; BUREL is again found to be
superior in both respects.
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Figure 7: Effect of varying dataset
We now examine the utility of the generalized table by aggrega-
tion queries introduced in Section 5. Each predicate pred(A) in
the query has the form of A ∈ RA. Let expected selectivity over
the table be 0<θ< 1. Assuming data are uniformly distributed, θ
can be achieved if each attribute A selects records within a range
of length |A|·θA of its domain, such that (θA)λ+1=θ. In effect, the
length of RA should be |A|·θ 1λ+1 , where |A| is the domain length
of attribute A. Given a query, the precise result prec is computed
from the original table, and an estimated result est is obtained from
the anonymized table. To calculate est, we assume that tuples in
each EC are uniformly distributed, and consider the intersection be-
tween the query and the EC. We define |est−prec|
prec
×100% as the
relative error. We measure the median relative error in a workload
of 10K queries. Relative error is undefined when prec is 0. If prec
in a query is 0, we drop that query.
In our first experiment, we use the first 5 attributes in Table 3 as
QI , with expected selectivity θ=0.1, and vary the dimensionality
of the query, i.e. the number of QI attributes λ on which predicates
are defined. As these attributes contribute to the error, the increase
of λ exercises a negative effect on error. However, as λ grows, the
length of the query range RA in the domain of each queried at-
tribute also grows (for constant θ); thereby, the minimum bounding
box of an EC becomes more likely to be entirely contained in the
query region. In effect, the error does not depend monotonically
on λ (Figure 8(a)); it does not matter much how many attributes a
given selectivity θ is shared among. In the next experiment, we fix
λ to 3, θ to 0.1, and vary β. Figure 8(b) shows the results. As β
grows, the privacy requirement is relaxed, hence information qual-
ity rises and the error drops. Next, we set θ to 0.1, and vary the
QI size. As the QI size increases, the data tend to be more sparse
in QI-space, hence it is more likely that ECs with bigger bounding
boxes are created. Thus, in Figure 8(c) the workload error increases
withQI size, for all compared methods, while BUREL presents the
most modest increase. Last, Figure 8(d) presents the results as a
function of selectivity θ. As θ grows, the length of the range RA
for each attribute in a predicate increases. This makes the minimum
bounding box of an EC more likely to be entirely contained in the
query region, so the estimate becomes more accurate and the error
smaller. BUREL achieves consistently better utility.
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6.3 Evaluation on Perturbation
In this section we evaluate the performance of our perturbation-
based β-likeness scheme discussed in Section 5. We keep the QI
value of each tuple unchanged, and only randomize its SA value ac-
cording to a certain probability defined in conditional Equation 12.
We emphasize that there does not exist information loss by gener-
alized QI values to examine as with BUREL, but we can study the
utility of perturbed data set, again by aggregation queries. How-
ever, unlike the query answer estimation for generalized data using
an intersection between the query and the EC, now we estimate the
result simply by reconstructing the original SA distribution from
the perturbed SA values of those tuples that satisfy a query’s QI
predicates as discussed in Section 5.
Since our β-likeness scheme by perturbation is built on (ρ1i,
ρ2i)-privacy, for the sake of convenience we represent it as (ρ1i,
ρ2i)-privacy. We emphasize that, on the one hand, BUREL is based
on generalization, with the desirable property of identity anony-
mity; on the other hand, (ρ1i, ρ2i)-privacy randomizes the SA value
of each tuple independently, and is thus immune to corruption at-
tacks, in which one may infer the SA value of a victim on con-
dition that they already know the SA values of some individuals
[30]. However, BUREL and (ρ1i, ρ2i)-privacy are mutually incom-
parable. Besides, there is no previous work that achieves a privacy
guarantee comparable to β-likeness by perturbation; the most re-
cent related work that offers a privacy guarantee by perturbation,
[5], is also built on (ρ1i, ρ2i)-privacy, yet only limits the posterior
probability of inferring any individual SA value, a privacy guaran-
tee comparable to ℓ-diversity. In the absence of another competitor,
we introduce and compare to a Baseline approach, which publishes
the exact QI value of each tuple together with the overall SA dis-
tribution in the original table, in the way of Anatomy [33].
Figure 9 shows our results. We first set QI size to be 5, query se-
lectivity θ = 0.1, and vary the number of QI-attributes in the aggre-
gation queries. The QI value of each tuple remains intact for both
(ρ1i, ρ2i)-privacy and Baseline. Thus, only the predicate on SA,
pred(SA), incurs an error. As λ grows, the query range interval
RSA for SA also increases, in effect more tuples satisfy the query,
and the reconstructed SA distribution is closer to the actual one.
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Therefore, as Figure 9(a) shows, the workload error decreases as a
function of λ. Next, we set λ = 3, θ = 0.1, and study the effect of
β. Baseline is independent of β; the small fluctuation of its curve is
due to the fact that we randomly generate RA (i.e., the query range
interval for an attribute) in each experiment. However, f(pi), the
allowed posterior confidence of an attacker on SA value vi, grows
as a function of β. A higher value of f(pi) implies a larger αi,
allowing for a higher probability that an SA value remains intact
after randomization. Therefore, the data utility rises as β grows
(Figure 9(b)). Next, we set β = 4, and vary QI size; Figure 9(c)
shows the results. As neither (ρ1i, ρ2i)-privacy nor Baseline modi-
fies any QI value, the utility of perturbed data depends on the input
data set. Therefore, the workload error does not change uniformly
with QI size. Last, we study the effect of varying θ. When θ is
larger, RSA also grows. Hence, more tuples satisfy the query, and
the result becomes more accurate, as Figure 9(d) shows. Remark-
ably, in all presented cases, the accuracy of our perturbation-based
scheme consistently outperforms that of the Baseline approach.
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7. RESISTANCE TO ATTACKS
We now discuss the resistance of our model and schemes to sev-
eral types of attack proposed in the literature.
A minimality attack [31] applies when an algorithm populates
ECs with tuples explicitly heeding to privacy considerations, mak-
ing decisions “uniquely decided by the sensitive value of a particu-
lar tuple” [34]. BUREL decides first on EC dimensions, consider-
ing SA values alone. Then, it decides on the particular contents of
each EC, independently of others, looking only at tuples’ QI values
and heeding to utility considerations; it does not decide whether to
put a given tuple in one EC or another by looking at its SA value.
This separation of tasks renders BUREL immune to minimality at-
tacks. Furthermore, [7] has shown that the minimality attack can
be easily averted even in the case of algorithms vulnerable to it.
A deFinetti attack [15] aims to learn the correlation between SA
values and QI values by building a Bayesian network; it starts by
assuming a random permutation to assign each SA value to a QI
value in each EC, and builds a Naı¨ve Bayes classifier out of all
such assignments. Then it evaluates the permutation assigned to
each EC, and generates an improved one, which is in turn used
to update the classifier. This iterative procedure goes on until it
converges. In other words, the classifier exploits divergences be-
tween the global information, as it appears in the whole published
table, and local knowledge within each EC, to iteratively correct
the SA to QI assignments within each EC. We deduce that, if this
divergence is controlled, the success potential of the deFinetti at-
tack can be correspondingly constrained. The β-likeness principle
delimits exactly this divergence by a threshold β, hence constrains
how much an attacker learns beyond the overall distribution in a
published table. We thus argue that β-likeness curbs the deFinetti
attack as the value of β prescribes. Intuitively, a lower β value al-
lows for smaller divergences and hence lower success rate of the
attack. We have defined β-likeness in a way that constrains posi-
tive, but not negative, information gain, as this is the cardinal need
in most practical circumstances. Still, a deFinetti attack may also
exploit negative divergences in order to construct its classifier. In
case such concerns arise, our model can be straightforwardly ex-
tended to constrain negative divergences as well, and thereby fur-
ther enhance its capacity to thwart such attacks.
Cormode [6] recently conducted an experimental study of the
deFinetti attack on Anatomy [33], an instantiation of ℓ-diversity,
concluding that the attack is effective for small values of ℓ (2,
3, 4). Still, as ℓ rises, the attack’s success rate deteriorates. In
particular, for ℓ = 5 the rate is below 50%, and when ℓ reaches
7 it falls below 30%. As the attack has so far only been imple-
mented against Anatomy, presenting the privacy of data anonymi-
zed by BUREL in terms of ℓ-diversity is relevant in this context.
β t Avg t ℓ Avg ℓ
1 0.02 0.01 19.0 20.7
2 0.09 0.04 11.0 15.9
3 0.13 0.04 8.7 14.2
4 0.16 0.04 7.2 13.6
5 0.17 0.05 6.6 12.6
The table on the right presents the
t and ℓ values achieved in terms
of t-closeness and ℓ-diversity, re-
spectively, for the data sets pub-
lished by β-likeness in the exper-
iment of Figure 4(a), with β set to 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5; Avg ℓ (t) stands
for the average diversity (closeness) for all the ECs. Notably, for
reasonable values of β, ℓ assumes values no less than 6 for which
the deFinetti attack’s succsess rate is low.
The hitherto discussed attacks are designed against generaliza-
tion-based schemes. Our perturbation scheme is not vulnerable to
them, as it involves no generalization. Moreover, as it randomizes
each SA value independently, it is immune to corruption attacks
[30], in which an attacker who is already aware of the SA values
of some individuals tries to infer that of a victim. Besides, our
schemes assume the anonymized data are published only once, so
as to prevent composition attacks [11]. Thwarting such attacks with
republication under β-likeness is a problem orthogonal to our work.
Cormode [6] also suggests an attack on differential privacy based
on a Naı¨ve Bayes classifier. Such a classifier predicts the SA value
of a tuple t with mQI-attribute values, tj , 1 ≤ j ≤ m, as:
vˆ(t) = argmax
vi∈V
Pr[vi]
∏m
j=1 Pr[tj |vi] (15)
The gist of the attack lies in the fact that the conditional probabil-
ities Pr[tj |vi] can be accurately learned based on noisy count query
results extracted from differentially private data. While the noise in
question conceals the contribution of any individual, its effect on
the derived Pr[tj |vi] is relatively small [6]; thus, the built classi-
fier works almost as effectively as in the noiseless case, exploiting
variations of Pr[tj |vi] values from their unconditional counterpart,
Pr[tj ] to produce a non-trivial prediction of vˆ(t). On the other
hand, β-likeness is defined in a way that explicitly bounds exactly
the variation of these conditional probabilities from their uncondi-
tional counterpart. Specifically, by Bayes’ rule, we get:
Pr[tj |vi] = Pr[vi|tj ]
Pr[vi]
Pr[tj ] (16)
For a given sensitive value vi∈V , Pr[vi] is the prior confidence
in vi based on the global distribution of SA values, which we have
hitherto denoted as pi, while Pr[vi|tj ] is the posterior confidence
that β-likeness bounds by f(pi) = (1+min{β,−ln pi})·pi. Then
β-likeness guarantees that Pr[tj |vi]≤ (1+min{β,−ln pi})·Pr[tj ].
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Thus, β-likeness bounds the conditional probabilities that the Naı¨ve
Bayes attack exploits, delimiting the extent to which their values
vary from Pr[tj ]. Consequently, β-likeness delimits the potential
for a Naı¨ve Bayes attack to succeed, causing Equation (15) to pre-
dict the most frequent SA value in the table most of the time.
The preceding analysis has been made without prejudice to the
publication format, and hence applies to any scheme satisfying β-
likeness. However, the same analysis can be made specifically for
publication by generalization. Assume BUREL outputs e ECs, and
f of those include QI attribute value tj . Let {G1, . . . , Gf} be the
set of ECs that contain tj , {Gf+1, . . . , Ge} the set of all other ECs,
and qki the frequency of SA value vi in EC Gk. Then it is:
Pr[tj |vi] = q
1
i |G1|+ q2i |G2|+ . . .+ qri |Gf |
pi · (|G1|+ . . .+ |Ge|) (17)
≤ (1 + min{β,−ln pi}) · |G1|+ . . .+ |Gf ||G1|+ . . .+ |Ge| (18)
≤ (1 + min{β,−ln pi}) · Pr[tj ] (19)
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The last inequality confirms our pre-
vious result. For illustration, we es-
timate Pr[tj |vj ] values as in Equation
(17) on the anonymized CENSUS data,
using the first three attributes as QI , to
predict the SA value of each tuple by
Equation (15), for β ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}.
We obtain the success rate shown in the figure above. As expected,
this success rate remains remarkably close to the frequency of the
most frequent SA value in the data, namely 4.8402%.
Last, we emphasize that β-likeness is a privacy model for cate-
gorical data. Its extension to numerical data is an interesting topic
for future research. Such an extension should constrain not merely
the variation in the frequencies of discrete numerical values, but
rather of any values in close proximity to each other. Doing so, it
would be immune to proximity attacks [19], as they apply on nu-
merical data. In case proximity is defined for categorical data by a
semantic hierarchy of categorical values, our model can be easily
extended so as to treat all values beneath the same selected nodes
in this hierarchy as the same, and ensure β-likeness for such groups
of values instead of leaf nodes in the hierarchy. We also emphasize
that out model is built under the assumption that an attacker has no
other prior knowledge apart from the overall distribution of sensi-
tive values. Rastogi et al. [26] show that, if an adversary knows
arbitrary correlations among tuples, there exists no useful anony-
mization algorithm that can achieve both privacy and utility.
8. CONCLUSION
In this paper we revisited the microdata anonymization problem
with three distinct contributions. First, we introduced β-likeness,
a robust privacy model that provides a comprehensible and intu-
itively appealing privacy guarantee, expressed as a limit on the rel-
ative confidence gain on each single sensitive attribute value. Sec-
ond, we devised BUREL, a novel generalization algorithm explic-
itly customized for this model. Third, we devised a perturbation
technique for our model. Our experimental results confirm that al-
gorithms developed for other privacy models cannot achieve strong
guarantees in terms of β-likeness, and verify the effectiveness and
efficiency of both our schemes in their task. Apart from this ex-
perimental study, we also provided arguments and results to the
effect that the β-likeness privacy guarantee affords genuine protec-
tion against attacks suggested in previous research. In the future,
we intend to extend our model to numerical sensitive attributes.
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